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Bargaining Realities
Responding to a Changing World
Sharon P. Smith 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company
As unions in the United States begin their second century, it has 
become increasingly obvious that they are in a stage of continuing and 
sharp decline in numbers and in overall influence. The decline, though 
not limited to the private sector, has been concentrated there. Union 
penetration of the private labor market (as measured by percent 
represented) reached a peak in 1953 and has now declined to the levels 
of nearly 50 years ago. l At the same time, the industries in which unions 
remain concentrated have been under pressure from a combination of 
forces: technology has changed the nature of work; deregulation has 
changed the ways many of these firms do business; and competition 
from abroad and from nonunion domestic firms has increased pressure 
on prices.
In response, collective bargaining has sometimes been observed to 
have moved in new directions as "unions and companies were groping 
to find ways to accommodate traditional union roles to very new 
economic patterns. . . . Could the parties convert their skill at dividing 
up the goodies to equally effective methods for combating the losses?" 2 
The bargaining that occurs in these circumstances has often been term 
ed "concession bargaining." To use such a label, however, ignores 
the fact that unions, management, and stockholders all share in the out 
come as firms respond to outside forces. Given this shared fate, it 
becomes clear that unions and management must choose between work 
ing jointly to meet the challenges of outside forces or fighting to main 
tain the status quo and in doing so accelerate their own decline. 3
Nowhere have these changes been more dramatic and concentrated 
than in the telecommunications industry. This industry was long at the 
forefront of technological change in the workplace: where technology
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changes the nature of work but "technological blur" often makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the functions performed by the worker 
and those performed by the machine. For example, with the introduc 
tion of LMOS/MLT (loop maintenance operations system/mechanized 
loop testing), a high-skill technical job has been transformed into a largely 
clerical job because the technical tasks that had been performed by the 
worker are now performed by the machine with which the worker in 
teracts. Moreover, in the 1980s, deregulation has changed the way firms 
do business in this industry and has subjected them to competitive 
pressures they have never experienced before. 4 Thus, a detailed ex 
amination of the recent bargaining in one part of the telecommunica 
tions industry AT&T can provide insight into how both sides of the 
bargaining table in any industry should respond to change.
The basic reality of 1986 bargaining was that the world had changed 
for both AT&T and its unions. A series of judicial and regulatory deci 
sions since the beginning of the decade had transformed the company 
into a very different employer from that which bargained its last con 
tract in August 1983. As a result of these institutional changes, the 1986 
contract was the first between parties with 40 years of bargaining history. 
The issues that were resolved wages, benefits, employment security, 
working practices had been addressed in previous bargainings, but the 
answers were different because of the institutional changes and because 
of company and union activities that took place between 1984 and 1986. 5
Institutional Background
AT&T began operations on January 1, 1984 as a divested company 
with approximately 260,000 occupational (nonmanagement) employees, 
of whom 90 percent were represented by unions. The principal unions 
were the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and the Inter 
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). There were also 
a number of smaller unions representing, in total, about 5 percent of 
the employees. Since 1974, bargaining between the Bell System and 
these unions had traditionally been carried on through a two-tier struc 
ture: national bargaining covered issues of universal application such
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as wage and benefit improvements, and local bargaining covered issues 
of regional or unit application generally referred to as working prac 
tices. The relationship between the company and these unions was 
generally excellent, as it had been characterized over recent years by 
an openness and a growing commitment to participation among the dif 
ferent parties.
The principal structural developments that influenced bargaining both 
individually and interactively were: the Amended New Entities 
Agreements (AMOA, effective in 1980, amended in 1982, and ter 
minated in 1987); Computer Inquiry II; and the Consent Decree. 6 The 
Amended New Entities Agreements applied to reassignments of 
represented employees made in connection with any corporate 
reorganization. They assured that no employee would lose representa 
tion status or the provisions of the then-existing collective bargaining 
agreements. In addition, the Agreements extended a number of 
assurances concerning employees' wages, benefits, credited service, 
and location.
Computer Inquiry n, issued in April 1980 as the Federal Communica 
tions Commission's (FCC's) final decision in its second Computer In 
quiry, represented the FCC's acknowledgment that the advance of 
technology had muted the distinction between data processing (com 
puters) and data transmission (telephones). Instead, the FCC drew a 
new distinction between "basic services," which would remain sub 
ject to regulation under the Communications Act of 1934, and "enhanced 
services," which would be open to all competitors. Accordingly, in 
keeping with this new distinction, AT&T was permitted to sell customer 
premises equipment and enhanced telecommunications services under 
the terms of this decision only through a subsidiary that was fully 
separated from the regulated businesses providing "basic services." 
The FCC made a ruling lifting this requirement in September 1985.
Prior to 1984, AT&T was the largest nonfmancial corporation in the 
world and the dominant firm in three separate, though interrelated, in 
dustries: the manufacture of telephone equipment, local telephone ser 
vice, and long distance telephone service. In 1974, the U.S. Justice 
Department filed a criminal antitrust suit against AT&T, charging it 
with monopolization and conspiracy. After six years in discovery, the
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suit went to trial in 1981. On January 8, 1982, AT&T and the Justice 
Department announced a Consent Decree to settle the suit out of court. 
Under the Consent Decree, the former Bell System was split into AT&T 
and seven Regional Holding Companies, which, in turn, encompassed 
22 Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). In exchange for AT&T's 
divesting itself of the operating companies, the antitrust suit was nullified 
and major markets were deregulated. The fundamental principle guiding 
the assignment of personnel in divestiture was that people would follow 
their work. Represented employees were afforded the protections of 
the AMOA. Therefore, when assigned, they carried with them their 
representation status and contracts.
Early Bargaining Efforts
Early in 1984, shortly after divestiture and while still in the first con 
tract year of the 1983 agreement, it became apparent that both AT&T 
and the BOCs had too many employees and too high costs for their new 
operating environments. At the same time, it was clear that AT&T's 
"business" had changed far more than the BOC's. In essence, the BOCs 
had kept the business they had before divestiture and that business was 
not cyclically sensitive. AT&T, in contrast, was a new company which 
faced an enormous integration problem. It had changed from a small, 
staff-oriented entity to a large company, heavily concentrated in manufac 
turing, but rapidly entering large, new ventures as well. Moreover, most 
of AT&T's business was highly sensitive to cyclical economic 
developments. In particular, AT&T was now facing domestic and foreign 
competition in its traditional business while simultaneously attempting 
to enter new businesses that were also highly competitive and in which 
market conditions were changing rapidly.
Accordingly, late in the spring, AT&T began discussions with its two 
principal unions intended to reduce costs by recasting their 1983 col 
lective bargaining agreements. There followed the first educational 
meetings with selected leaders of both unions to bring them to an 
understanding of the changes divestiture had brought to the business in 
terms of both the financial requirements and the standards of business 
performance that would be necessary for this new business to succeed.
Bargaining Realities 17
The company sought to transform the second and third contract an 
niversary increases, due in August of each year and consisting ofcost- 
of-living adjustments (COLA) and bargained-for increases, into one- 
time issuances of stock. The "one-time" aspect of the payment would 
reduce the subsequent cost impact of the increases and the stockowner 
aspect was thought to provide a special incentive to improve operating 
performance. However, this early bargaining effort went nowhere. The 
principal reason was one of timing: the proposed change was introduc 
ed too close to the August 1984 payment date for the unions to build 
consensus for the ratification needed to rewrite the collective bargain 
ing agreements.
Consequently, early hi 1985 and well before the August 1985 pay 
ment date, the company began discussions with the unions under the 
auspices of the Common Interest Forum (GIF) aimed not at amending 
the 1983 agreements but actually terminating them early and bargain 
ing new three-year agreements. The intention was to negotiate 
agreements that would slow the growth in labor costs and change the 
contract date from that held in common with the divested companies. 
(The GIF had been established in the 1983 agreements as a vehicle with 
a threefold mission: to communicate and discuss business developments 
of mutual interest; to discuss and review jointly "innovative approaches 
to enhance the competitiveness of the Company and improve employ 
ment security;" and to avoid unnecessary disputes by cooperatively ad 
dressing changes in the environment.)
The problem here was twofold. The Company had recognized that 
divestiture had totally changed the business environment from one in 
which many markets were guaranteed and costs were covered and returns 
assured as long as the commissions agreed to set rates appropriately 
to one in which there were many competitors, prices of products and 
services were market driven and not set to cover both costs and a 
specified rate of return. Therefore, in order to change its behavior ac 
cordingly, the Company was attempting to slow the long-term rise in 
costs. The second problem was to separate AT&T from the BOCs in 
all future bargaining; bargaining had been common since 1974 but, with 
business environments now dramatically different, an overt separation 
of bargaining process and timing appeared appropriate.
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The GIF discussions began with a full-scale educational program for 
the leaders of both unions to bring them to a better understanding of 
the emerging nature of the business. This was clearly in the spirit of 
the GIF contract language: that information would be shared and solu 
tions sought in a fully participative fashion. Indeed, the information 
presented to the unions was sufficiently sensitive and detailed to give 
the union leaders insider status under the provisions of the Securities 
and Exchange Act.
The theme of these discussions was the need to extend the participative 
relationship between company and unions by putting into place a more 
competitive cost structure that would promote profitability for the com 
pany, generate jobs, and generally insure employment security. 
Specifically, the company sought to abandon its past practice of bargain 
ing for regular annual improvements in basic compensation and remove 
wages from the bargaining arena. Instead, consistent with the par 
ticipative approach, the company proposed to replace regular bargain 
ed wage increases with profit sharing, thus making compensation con 
tingent on firm performance. The lump sum nature of profit sharing 
would also reduce the subsequent cost impact of the compensation in 
crease. At the same time, the company directly addressed the union's 
concerns over employment security with the offer of a job bank that 
would guarantee a job offer to any union-represented worker with at 
least five years of service who would otherwise be without a job.
Ultimately, this attempt at early bargaining, like the 1984 attempt, 
was to no avail. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that 
internal division in the CWA precluded the termination of the existing 
agreement. (The company practice in this special bargaining was, as 
in past ordinary bargaining, to seek agreement first with its major union, 
the CWA, and to make no agreements otherwise with the IBEW or any 
other smaller unions.) It became evident that the changes embodied in 
this contract were too dramatic and potentially controversial to be en 
dorsed publicly by the membership of the union.
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Changing the Contract Date
By fall 1985, there were no more savings to be made by moving 
bargaining up, as the second anniversary and final contractual increase 
had already been granted. Nevertheless, an earlier contract date than 
August 1986 continued to have merit from the company's perspective 
for two principal reasons: (1) it would put AT&T's bargaining before 
the BOC's and thereby remove pressure to conform with their pattern; 
and (2) it would ease the ratification process in union locals containing 
both AT&T and BOC employees if there were no side-by-side com 
parisons of different contracts.(This would be the first time that such 
employees, who, in some instances, were still co-located, would not 
receive the same wage treatment.)
Meanwhile, logistical problems began to emerge for the IBEW: the 
simultaneous bargaining of AT&T and BOC contracts would require 
key bargainers to be in multiple locations at the same time. Discus 
sions begun late in 1985 suggested that the idea of moving the contract 
date up was attractive to all concerned. Thus, all parties agreed to ter 
minate the contract on May 31, 1986 rather than August 9, 1986, as 
originally specified.
Issues in the 1986 Bargaining
Company Perspective
The basic company concern in 1986 bargaining remained the same 
as it had been in the abortive attempts to bargain early: the need to 
strengthen the company's competitive position. With divestiture, AT&T 
had entered fast-paced, competitive, and largely nonrepresented markets, 
saddled with a high cost structure, inflexible job designs, and outmod 
ed work practices inherited from its days as a regulated monopoly. The 
company had specific objectives in several areas.
The number one objective was to obtain a minimum economic set 
tlement. At the outset, the company had clearly indicated to both unions 
that it would not seek to cut wages or obtain similar concessions in benefit 
areas but, rather, would attempt to slow the rate of increase in 
compensation.
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In preparation for bargaining, the company had made a comprehen 
sive analysis of its employees' relative wage position. This study con 
firmed that AT&T's wages were consistently and substantially above 
the market for comparable jobs (both in local labor markets and among 
product/service market competitors). This advantageous wage position 
had not happened overnight, but rather had developed gradually over 
the previous dozen years due in large part to a rich COLA clause. In 
deed, COLA accounted for over two-thirds of the total wage increase 
during the period.
A specific objective, then, was to start to move AT&T's wages closer 
to the market by bargaining a pattern of wage increases substantially 
below the market norm. The company commissioned detailed forecasts 
of expected increases in wage rates to estimate the parameters for 
bargained increases that would still allow the market to outpace it. These 
forecasts clearly suggested that progress could be made only if COLA 
were either paid lump sum or eliminated from the contract. The com 
pany recognized, however, that it had taken years to create the wage 
advantage for AT&T workers and that it would also take years to move 
them back closer to the market.
Minimizing the size of the contractual wage increases was only one 
of several company bargaining objectives designed to put into place a 
more competitive cost structure. It was equally important that key 
workforces, namely, technical maintenance and installation, be restruc 
tured to align their skills and wage rates with those of AT&T's com 
petitors in this service market. In particular, the company proposed to 
stratify this top technical force into three skill levels, job titles, and cor 
responding wage schedules to align more closely with the practice of 
competitors than did AT&T's traditional single-title organization. 
Analogous changes for AT&T's factories included the consolidation of 
manufacturing job grades to reduce costly movement of personnel and 
the elimination of the wage incentive payment system as an expensive 
and inappropriate wage adder in high-technology manufacturing.
Detailed analysis had confirmed that the employees' advantageous 
wage position was compounded by a rich benefit package. Therefore, 
the company's aim in bargaining was to make minimal improvements  
small pension increases and the introduction of a 401 (k) plan only if
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the wage settlement was satisfactory. At the same time, the company 
wished to continue to extend health care cost containment measures and, 
in addition, make some major moves similar to those already im 
plemented for management which were primarily designed to control 
utilization.
The company recognized that in order to reach agreement with the 
unions it would have to address satisfactorily the question of employ 
ment security. At the same time, it was essential that this be done without 
guarantees of employment or any commitments to make firm job of 
fers when employment is terminated by layoff. Although such an offer 
had been made during the 1985 GIF discussions, it was no longer a 
point for discussion.
The AMOA had assured that employees brought their contracts with 
them to new organizations. This meant that an individual entity could 
have 22 separate contracts and, in fact, could have employees working 
side-by-side with different contracts. Accordingly, a key company ob 
jective in 1986 bargaining was to consolidate the provisions of multi 
ple operating company contracts into one comprehensive contract for 
each bargaining unit.
An equally important company objective was the replacement of 
restrictive contracting-out language in the 1983 Contract with language 
better suited to a competitive environment.
Union Perspective
Meanwile, developments within the company during the previous three 
years, particularly the announcement in August 1985 of a major downsiz 
ing amounting to 16,500 represented employees, as well as events in 
other collective bargaining situations, had intensified union concerns 
for their members' prospective compensation and employment securi 
ty. The unions had specific objectives in several areas.
The unions were strongly committed to maintaining the form and size 
of wage increases they had bargained in previous contracts. Indeed, 
both unions indicated that they would seek to enhance the COLA por 
tion of the increase by improving the payout ratio, a move that would 
help support the same percent rise in wages in the face of the recent 
quiescence in inflation. More importantly, the CWA took a strong public
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stand against concessions, two-tier arrangements, and lump sum ap 
plications, arguing that this contract would mark a turning point not 
only for their own union but also for the American labor movement 
by reversing the recent trend toward settlements containing such 
provisions.
The whole issue of employment security was of paramount concern 
to the unions. The union objective in bargaining was to enhance ex 
isting programs, such as the existing income protection programs for 
surplus employees who terminate voluntarily, as well as to break new 
ground in this area. The CWA, in particular, indicated that it would 
seek to expand the job bank concept that had been offered in the abor 
tive GIF discussions into a lifetime employment guarantee for employees 
with at least two years of service. In addition, a key CWA goal was 
the establishment of a company-funded, jointly administered, train 
ing/retraining fund, in clear recognition that the only form of employ 
ment security that can be sustained over the long term is one which 
combines a series of different jobs with the training needed to perform 
them.
Another union objective was to obtain some improvement, principally 
in pension benefits and in the introduction of a 401 (k) plan, and to resist 
any shifting of health care costs from the company to employees. The 
thrust in the pension area appeared to reflect a union conviction that 
their members had lost ground in pension benefits due to the plan's be 
ing changed in 1980 from a final dollar to a dollar per month basis.
Progress of Bargaining
Early in 1986, the company's set of issues and the unions' set of issues 
were exchanged and became the subjects of private discussions at various 
levels. The normal give-and-take of public meetings and private discus 
sions proceeded on schedule. The company was following past bargain 
ing practice of making no agreement until it had settled with the CWA. 
As the final day approached, however, thought was given to the possibili 
ty that settlement could be reached with the IBEW and not the CWA.
As the midnight deadline drew closer, private discussions focused 
on the size of the wage package, contracting, and minor issues that did
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not appear to stand in the way of a settlement. 7 The wage difference 
between company and union positions was small an amount, in fact, 
that would not have produced a strike in previous bargainings between 
the two parties. Nevertheless, agreement on wages was not reached with 
the CWA and a 26-day strike resulted. 8 Agreement was reached on time 
with the DBEW and on the same terms that had been offered to the CWA.
Strike
Beginning with the decision to settle with the IBEW, through the time 
that the CWA strike was settled, the company's behavior was very dif 
ferent from its predivestiture bargaining conduct. All of the company's 
actions had their origin in its determination to behave as a company 
in the competitive arena rather than in a regulated environment, shielded 
from market forces. This was manifested in three key decisions: (1) the 
decision to make a final offer and to settle on this even if full agree 
ment with all parties was not possible; (2) the decision to engage in 
an aggressive public relations campaign to present this package direct 
ly to the striking workers; and (3) the decision to hire people off the 
street to replace striking operators, not to break the union but rather 
to maintain customer service.
Once the company had acted on the first decision, it was imperative 
to adhere to this as the only possible offer to emphasize its will to 
stand on its position and to avoid embarrassing the parties already in 
agreement. Meanwhile, the company's decision to wage an aggressive 
public relations campaign became an essential tactic in the effort to bring 
about agreement among all parties. The company adopted the philosophy 
of going public on its final offer, based in large part on its concern that 
the terms of that offer were clouded with the misinformation circulating 
during the weekend the strike began.
The IBEW resolve to stand by its acceptance of the company's offer 
also provided support to the points in this final offer. On June 10, the 
leaders of the Telephone Coordinating Council (representing a mixture 
of clerical and technical workers) recommended ratification to their
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members (whose ballot vote would be completed by July 5). Then, on 
June 15, the members of the EM-3 (which is the manufacturing unit 
of the IBEW and meets in convention to vote on an agreement) ratified 
the contract.
When agreement was finally reached between the company and the 
CWA, it was on essentially the same terms as the final offer. The dif 
ferences, which were incorporated in the IBEW agreement, were essen 
tially of an informational nature and reflected the clarification discus 
sions that had been conducted since the strike began. There were three 
principal changes: (1) the inclusion of the COLA language into the agree 
ment, though the provisions were still inapplicable; (2) some additional 
protections to employees affected by job-structure changes; and (3) some 
changes in the language on contracting.
Reasons for the CWA Strike
To some extent, the failure to settle was a risk that was heightened 
when each party agreed to negotiate early. With the AT&T contract 
as front-runner to all the BOC negotiations, the settlement reached, which 
many analysts had thought would be a floor for all the negotiations in 
the former Bell System, became a ceiling for all the BOC settlements 
to follow.9
At the most basic level, it appears that the strike reflected a union 
miscalculation of company resolve on the wage issue. It is true that com 
pany bargaining behavior predivestiture would, in fact, cast some doubt 
on its willingness to take such a position and stand by it. Nevertheless, 
there had been efforts for more than two years to bring the union to 
an understanding of the changes in the company's operating environ 
ment and the fact that cutting costs would help enhance overall business 
performance of the company, which would help preserve jobs. Despite 
the lengthy discussions and briefings, despite bringing the union into 
insider status, each side ultimately failed to understand the other's posi 
tion. The strike, then, became the ultimate means for each side to reach 
such an understanding. 10
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The bargaining that took place from divestiture through the 1986 con 
tract negotiations, viewed in its entirety, demonstrates that adjusting 
to a changing environment can be a slow and painful process of learn 
ing and compromise. Fischer has suggested that success in this area 
is best achieved through the full cooperation and participation of manage 
ment and labor.
Unions should review their 50-year history. The pre-1980 
labor relations patterns represent a labor concession to the 
most basic of management demands the unbridled right to 
manage. Unions did not succeed in seriously eroding the right 
of management to decide and to direct. . . . Now, when many 
management forces seek to concede some of what they 
previously rejected, unions are usually found protesting. . . . 
Managers are not embracing worker involvement as a result 
of an ideological conversion, but are merely responding to 
new urgencies, new economic pressures, the broader and 
more potent options of consumers. 11
Although this process has not always been smooth for AT&T and 
the CWA and IBEW, progress has been achieved. Together they have 
moved to reshape the company to fit its new competitive environment 
while simultaneously addressing the employment needs of the workers 
in this more uncertain world. Further progress will best be achieved 
when all parties recognize that even when interests are in intrinsic con 
flict, problems can best be solved to the mutual satisfaction of all through 
a participative and collaborative approach, and when all parties share 
in the responsibility of the decision and the rewards that result.
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